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CMP Christian mystical practice 
CP Christian practice 
]d Deontological justification 
Abbreviations 
]di Involuntary deontological justification 
]c Evaluative justification 
]cg Grounds evaluative justification 
]t'g Grounds evaluative justification (applied to epistemic practices) 
]n Normative justification 
)ns Strong normative justification 
]nw Weak normative justification 
PP Perceptual practice 
PT Parity thesis. There are many versions of the parity thesis, the 
most general of which is this: Under appropriate conditions, (1) 
S's engaging in an epistemic practice EP, which generates theis­
tic beliefs (of a specified kind), or (2) S's believing that p, where 
p is a theistic belief (of a specified kind), has the same level and 
(specified) kind of epistemic status as (3) S's engaging in an 
epistemic practice EP*, which generates nontheistic beliefs (of a 
specified kind), or (4) S's believing that p*, where p* is a non­
theistic belief (of a specified kind). 
PTA Alston's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both S's en­
gaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are )nw· 
x i v  J Abbreviations 
PT AS Alston's strong parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, both 
S's engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are Jt'w 
PT� Alston's parity thesis* : Under appropriate conditions, both S's 
engaging in CP and S's engaging in PP are prima facie rational. 
PT N New parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, engaging in CP 
and engaging in unique person practice have, for S, the same 
level and strength of overall rationality. 
PTp1 Plantinga's parity thesis: Under appropriate conditions, where no 
overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about 
God, has the same nonclassical normative proper basicality (the 
strongest level) as S's belief that p*, where p* is a paradigm 
belief. 
P1\� Plantinga's parity thesis': Under appropriate conditions, where no 
overriders are present, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about 
God, has at least the same nonclassical normative proper ba­
sicality (the strongest level) as S' s belief that p*, where p* is a 
perceptual belief. 
PT1� Plantinga's parity thesis*: For person S, whose epistemic equip­
ment is functioning properly in the appropriate environment, 
paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same level of epis­
temic warrant. 
PTt,; Plantinga' s parity thesis*' : For a person S, whose epistemic 
equipment is functioning properly in the appropriate environ­
ment, physical object beliefs and theistic beliefs have the same 
level of epistemic warrant. 
SP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice 
SPP Sense perceptual (doxastic) practice 
Rationality and 
Theistic Belief 
